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A growing body of evidence suggests that schools use test exemption to game educational 
accountability systems. However, it is not known whether test exemption affects students’ 
academic progress. Analyzing data from an urban school district in Texas, we find that 
special education students make larger achievement gains when they are tested. Using our 
most conservative estimates, the effect of being tested is approximately .40 standard 
deviations in reading and .28 standard deviations in math for grades 3-8. Because special 
education students are more likely to be minority and poor students and these students are 
more likely to be exempted than their white and non-poor special education counterparts, 
the exemption of special education students contributes to the growth of black-white, 
Hispanic-white, and high-low socioeconomic status achievement gaps.  
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| 1 | INTRODUCTION 
or the last fifty years, American education policy has attempted to close achievement 
gaps between advantaged and disadvantaged groups. Despite these efforts, significant 
gaps persist between the academic performance of white and African-American and 
Hispanic, poor and privileged, special education and general education, and English 
language learners and native speakers (Brooks-Gunn, Klebanov, & Duncan, 1995; Cook & 
Evans, 2000; Fryer & Levitt, 2004; Phillips, Crouse, & Ralph, 1998). Most recently, the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2001 sought to narrow these gaps by requiring states to test 
students in grades 3-8 annually and to disaggregate scores by race, ethnicity, poverty, special 
education, and English proficiency status. Schools are held accountable for improving the 
performance of students in each of these subgroups so that all students reach proficiency in 
math and reading by 2014. The theory underlying this law is that educators will channel 
more time, resources, and attention to minority students, poor students, and students with 
special educational needs when their performance is made public and schools are held 
accountable for results.  
However, many recent studies have documented that schools “game the system” to 
artificially inflate their passing rates (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Deere & Strayer, 2001; Figlio, 
2005; Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Jacob, 2005; Jacob & Levitt, 2003; Haney, 2000; McNeil, 
2000, 2005; McNeil & Valenzuela, 2001; Vasquez Heilig, 2006).  At least two types of 
gaming are possible. In one scenario, educators do not alter the way they allocate 
instructional resources. Instead, they adopt a series of creative accounting practices such as 
exempting potentially low-scoring students from state tests in order to artificially increase 
passing rates (Cullen & Reback, 2006; Figlio & Getzler, 2002; Figlio, 2005; Jacob, 2005). 
In a second scenario, educators fundamentally change the way that they distribute 
educational resources by diverting resources to students close to passing the test and thus 
most likely to improve the passing rate, or shifting resources away from exempted students 
who will not sit for state tests (Gillborn & Youdell, 2000; Reback, 2006). These two 
mechanisms have very different implications for the No Child Left Behind Act’s potential to 
attenuate achievement gaps. While the first scenario might leave real achievement gaps 
unaltered while reporting that such gaps have narrowed, the second has the potential to 
further exacerbate these gaps.  
In this study, we take advantage of a unique feature of Texas’ accountability system to test 
the hypothesis that educators game the accountability system by exempting low-scoring 
students from taking high-stakes tests and subsequently allocate resources strategically to 
tested students. Texas allows educators to exempt special education students and English 
Language Learners (ELLs) from taking mainstream high-stakes state tests. While the rules 
regarding ELL exemptions are more stringent, only one-third of special education students in 
our study take mainstream state tests. In place of the high-stakes exam, exempted special 
education students take an alternate assessment for which each student’s Individual 
Education Plan committee sets the passing rate individually. As a result of this feature—that 
is, some special education students “count” towards the school’s accountability rating, while 
others do not—schools and teachers may recognize that the marginal investment in a student 
who counts towards the accountability rating will yield greater returns than an investment in 
a student who does not “count.”  By analyzing this setting, we can gain insight into two key 
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policy questions: first, how might schools use exemptions if the exemption provisions in the 
No Child Left Behind Act are extended, and second, in the context of a high-stakes testing 
system, do special education students gain more academically when they are tested than they 
would if they were not tested?  
 
| 2 | LITERATURE REVIEW 
hould NCLB hold schools accountable for all students, including special education 
students and English Language Learners (ELL)? Initially, NCLB allowed only one 
percent of students to take an alternate assessment while being counted towards the 
95% participation requirement. In response to mounting pressure, the U.S. Department of 
Education amended this rule in March 2005, inviting states to apply for a variance from the 
one percent cap and develop alternate assessments for an additional two percent of disabled 
students. Altogether, the regulations now allow schools to test up to three percent of students 
on an alternate assessment and count these scores toward adequate yearly progress 
requirements (U.S. Department of Education, 2007).  However, as NCLB approaches 
reauthorization, participation requirements have again resurfaced as a key policy concern.   
Two competing goals of accountability systems—to improve the performance of all students 
and to fairly measure the performance of schools—suggest different remedies to the 
participation question. Proponents of holding all students to the same standard (i.e., testing 
all students on the same grade-level tests) contend that exemptions or alternate assessments 
for these students perpetuate the educational neglect that NCLB is intended to correct. If 
students are exempted or held to a different standard, they argue, schools will have little 
incentive to focus time and attention on these students. As a result, they are unlikely to ever 
reach proficiency.  The consequence of excluding some students, according to this view, is 
their loss of access to scarce educational resources. Avoiding such negative consequences 
would entail testing and holding schools accountable for all students, though measurement 
accuracy would be sacrificed and schools serving the most vulnerable students would be 
unfairly penalized.  
Opponents of NCLB’s current participation requirements hold that grade-level English-only 
tests are inappropriate measures for some special education and ELL students. Requiring 
students to take these tests, it is argued, is detrimental to the students themselves and 
punishes schools serving large numbers of these students. If accuracy of measurement is 
privileged, these students should be excluded from accountability calculations. Adherents to 
this view believe that there are valid reasons, from both an educational and a measurement 
perspective, for excluding categories of students from schools’ scores. 
A growing body of literature suggests that when schools are given the opportunity to exempt 
students, exemptions are used strategically. Figlio and Getzler (2002) analyzed data from 
Florida to determine whether low-achieving students were more likely to be classified as 
special education following the introduction of high-stakes tests. In their most conservative 
estimates (estimating student fixed effects models and controlling for separate classification 
time trends for low and high income students), they found that the introduction of high-
stakes testing increased non-low-income students’ risk of classification by .9 percentage 
S 
  3
points. The effects on low-income students were larger; the introduction of high-stakes 
testing was associated with a 3.9 percent increase in students’ risk of classification.  Figlio and 
Getzler further determined that low-scoring students were more likely to be classified than 
high-achieving students, and that this effect was strongest in high-poverty schools.   
Jacob (2005) also investigated the relationship between high-stakes testing and special 
education classification. Analyzing data from Chicago, his study incorporated a rich set of 
controls (student demographic characteristics and prior achievement, as well as school and 
neighborhood characteristics) and found that the introduction of high stakes testing was 
associated with a one percent increase in special education classification. However, these 
effects varied by the school’s achievement; special education classification for low-achieving 
students (those in the bottom quartile of the national distribution) attending a school in the 
bottom one-third of Chicago schools increased 3.6 percent, while the increase in middle-
achieving schools was 2.1 percent. High-stakes testing had no effect on special education 
classification for low-achieving students in the top one-third of schools. Jacob found 
additional manipulation of score reporting as Chicago maintained a policy where students 
could be tested and their scores withheld. Low-achieving students in low-achieving schools 
were 1.6 percent less likely to have their scores reported, while low-achieving students in 
middle-achieving schools were 2.2 percent less likely to have their scores reported. Again, 
Jacob found that high-stakes testing had no effect on score reporting in high-achieving 
schools.  
Finally, Cullen and Reback (2006) analyzed data from Texas and found that schools use 
exemption strategically. In a particularly comprehensive treatment of individual schools’ 
incentives to exempt students, they determined that proximity to the next accountability 
rating increased the percentage of students exempted by 11 percent. Moreover, they also 
found that when the performance of Hispanic and African-American students would keep 
schools from achieving a higher rating, exemption rates increased for these groups by 7 and 
14 percent, respectively.  
These studies provide strong evidence that schools use exemption provisions to game the 
system. However, the total impact of exemption on school passing rates and achievement 
gaps, as well on the impact of exemption of student achievement, has not been addressed in 
the current literature. These omissions result both from data availability as well as the 
structure of many exemption policies. Few states and districts require students to sit for 
multiple assessments; if a student is exempted from a high-stakes test, there is no 
supplementary record of the student’s achievement. Furthermore, estimating the “treatment 
effect” of testing on students requires that a substantial number of students with similar 
propensities to take a high-stakes exam are assigned to either a “testing” or “exemption” 
condition. Yet as the studies above document, strong selection pressures drive higher 
achieving students into the high-stakes testing treatment. Consequently, it is difficult to 
construct accurate comparison groups for tested students.  
In what follows, we use a unique student-level dataset from the Houston Independent 
School District to fill this gap in the literature. In line with the studies reviewed above, we 
first assess the extent to which educators utilize exemption strategically. If educators use 
exemption as a tool to increase their schools’ scores, we expect to find that low-scoring 
students have higher odds of test exemption. We then evaluate the impact of these 
exemptions on schools’ passing rates and determine how test exemption changes schools’ 
  4
passing rates as well as the estimated size of achievement gaps. Low-scoring students are not 
equally distributed across demographic groups, and if low-scoring students are more likely to 
be exempted, their exclusion will alter the estimated achievement gaps of some groups more 
than others. Next, we estimate the causal effect of taking Texas’ high-stakes test on special 
education students’ year-to-year academic growth and determine the extent to which the 
treatment effect of testing varies by students’ propensity to take Texas’ high-stakes test.   
Finally, we test the robustness of our estimates by simulating the impact of an unobserved 
variable on the magnitude of treatment effects. Taken together, these analyses inform current 
policy debates over the issue of test exemption in high-stakes accountability systems.  
 
| 3 | DATA AND METHODS 
n this study, we analyze a longitudinal dataset of all students tested in the Houston 
Independent School District (HISD) for the six school years ending in 2003-2004. 
HISD is the seventh largest school district in the country and the largest in the state of 
Texas. Fifty-six percent of HISD students are Hispanic, while 31 percent are African 
American. Seventy-four percent of students qualify for free or reduced-price lunch. Twenty-
four percent of students are classified as Limited English Proficient (LEP), and 11 percent are 
classified as special education. The composition of HISD thus makes it a useful test case in 
evaluating NCLB’s potential impact on poor students, students of color, and students with 
special needs. 
Our data include test scores for students in grades one to 11 (the Texas Assessment of 
Knowledge and Skills (the TAKS), the Stanford 10 Achievement Test1, and the Spanish-
language version of this test (the Aprenda) both of which are nationally norm-referenced 
exams), demographic data, and classification status data for approximately 160,000 students 
per year for each of the six years. Approximately 130,000 of these students are enrolled in 
TAKS-tested grades, grades 3-11. Because our dataset includes two measures of student 
achievement for each school year, it represents a significant improvement upon previously 
available student-level administrative data.  
We present three sets of analyses to address our questions of interest: 
1) Do schools strategically exempt low-scoring students, and how does the use of 
exemption vary across schools?   
2) How does student exemption impact schools’ passing rates and the estimated size 
of achievement gaps?  
3) What is the causal effect of testing on special education students’ academic 
growth? In other words, do tested special education students gain more academically 
than they would if they were not tested?  
We first estimate students’ odds of exemption using a multilevel logistic regression model, 
where students (level 1) are nested within-schools (level 2). The dependent variable in this 
analysis is whether the student took the TAKS test in math or reading. As discussed 
previously, an off-grade level test, the SDAA, is also offered for special education students, 
I 
  5
and Texas counts these students as passing if they meet the criteria set by their special 
education committee. The state mandates that special education students whose individual 
education plans specify instruction in grade-level state standards should take the TAKS. 
Accordingly, we include in our analysis only those students who also took the Stanford or 
Aprenda tests, which are on-grade level tests. Based on the state’s regulations, any student 
sitting for the Stanford or Aprenda exams should also sit for the TAKS exam.  
Because the relationship between TAKS test taking and the two versions of the low-stakes 
test (Stanford and Aprenda) are potentially different, we estimate separate models for the 
English and Spanish TAKS tests. In the first model, taking the English TAKS is the 
dependent variable; all students in this analysis took the Stanford 10. The second model 
includes students who took the Spanish Aprenda test (only offered in grades 3-5), and the 
dependent variable is taking the Spanish TAKS exam.  Each of these models takes the form:  
logit{Pr yij= 1 | (Xij, ζ j)}
 =  β1 + β2LOW-STAKES SCOREi + β3GRADE LEVELi + β4RACEi 
+ β5POORi + β6LEPi + β7SPECIAL EDUCATIONi  + ζ j + εij  
 
where yij  is the test taking status of student i in school j, Xij are characteristics of the student i 
displayed on the right hand side of the equation, and  ζ j is a random intercept that varies 
across schools. Both GRADE and RACE are vectors of dummy variables, where the reference 
categories are 11th grade and Asian, respectively. In our model of Spanish TAKS test taking, 
the reference grade is 5th grade; race is not included as all students are Hispanic.  Because we 
expected the effects of the low-stakes test on high-stakes testing to be non-linear, the low-
stakes score is represented as five dummy variables coded as 1 if the student is in the 0-9th, 
10-19th, 20-29th, 30-39th, and 40-49th percentile of the national distribution. The 
reference category is a score in the 50th percentile or above.  
How would we know if schools used exemption to “game the system?” After all, many 
educators feel that they are acting in the best interests of the students themselves when they 
exempt students from taking a test that is inappropriate for them. In order to rule out this 
alternate explanation for educators’ behavior, we exclude from our analyses those students 
with cognitive disabilities so severe that they did not also take the low-stakes Stanford 10 or 
Aprenda exam (1.5% of students in Houston). The Stanford 10 and the Aprenda are on-
grade level tests; students who are able to take this on-grade level low-stakes test should, from 
an educational standpoint, also be able to take the high-stakes test. If low-scoring students 
are more likely to be exempted, this would suggest that exemption is used strategically.  Our 
models predicting English TAKS test taking include 117,593 students for Reading and 
117,635 students for Math. Our models predicting Spanish TAKS test taking include 9,412 
students for Reading and 9,397 students for Math. Altogether, our models for this section of 
the paper include 127,005 and 127,032 students for reading and math, respectively. In this 
paper, we estimate these models only for the 2003-2004 school year.   
In the second part of our study, we estimate the impact of student exemption on schools’ 
scores and the perceived size of the achievement gap. Because our data include a second 
measure of achievement, we use multiple imputation to estimate high-stakes scores for each 
of the students excluded from the test (Rubin, 1987). Traditional imputation replaces each 
missing value with a single prediction. Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo methods, multiple 
imputation takes into account the uncertainty about the correct value, and instead identifies 
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a set of possible values for each missing data point.  Students’ Stanford/Aprenda scores, in 
addition to student demographics, program status, and grade level were all used in the 
imputation. Five imputations were performed, and the differences between the imputations 
were not statistically significant. We then re-estimated schools’ passing rates and simulated 
how schools would have performed if all students were tested and counted in schools’ pass 
rates. 
Finally, we ask whether an “educational treatment”—that is, being tested on the high-stakes 
test—affects special education students’ academic growth between 2003 and 2004.  Before 
describing the analytic strategy we use to estimate these effects, it is important to draw a 
distinction between the way that the term “treatment” is generally used and the way it is 
deployed in this paper. For example, in the context of a medical study of the effects of a drug 
on blood pressure, the “treatment” is the drug, and the difference in blood pressure at the 
end of the study between patients randomly assigned to control and treatment groups is the 
“treatment effect.” In this case, the test itself is not the treatment. Rather, the treatment is 
the educational process set into motion if a student will be tested on a high-stakes test. Two 
mechanisms are possible. First, teachers may invest more time and resources in a special 
education student who will be tested than one who will not; as a result, this student will 
exhibit more academic growth. Second, if students are notified early in the school year that 
they will be tested and they are more motivated by the TAKS test than the special education 
SDAA test, they may exert more effort, which may in turn lead to larger achievement gains.   
Ideally, in order to test the hypothesis that special education students exhibit greater 
achievement gains when they are tested, we would conduct an experiment and randomly 
assign students to tested and untested groups. Since conducting such an experiment is not 
feasible, we adopt a counterfactual framework of causality (Rubin, 1977; Rosenbaum & 
Rubin 1983a, 1984, 1985; Rosenbaum, 2002). Here a causal effect is defined as the 
difference between the academic growth a special education student in a world where he is 
tested compared to the growth the same student would have exhibited had he not been 
tested. Of course, no student can, in a given year, be both tested and not tested, a problem 
which Holland (1986) coined “the fundamental problem of causal inference.”   
Establishing the causal effect of being tested on the high-stakes test on students’ academic 
achievement is not straightforward because students are not randomly assigned to 
“treatment” and “control” conditions. On many observable characteristics, tested special 
education students differ from those who are not tested. Most tested students have very low 
probabilities of being exempted, while most exempted students have very low probabilities of 
being tested. To address this selection bias and accurately estimate the causal effect of testing 
on students’ year-to-year academic growth, we used propensity score matching, which allows 
us to simulate treatment and control groups from observational data.  
With unlimited data, we could match students perfectly on all observable characteristics to 
which we have access.  In the absence of such data, we can construct a one number summary 
of students’ probability of being tested: the propensity score. Untested students with similar 
propensities to be tested serve as the counterfactual for tested students.  If matched treated 
and control students are balanced on students’ observed pre-treatment characteristics—that 
is, treatment and control groups have statistically indistinguishable differences in their 
observable characteristics—the differences in achievement gains for students can be 
understood as the effect of being tested (Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983a).   
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To predict each student’s propensity score, we estimated a logistic regression where the 
dependent variable was taking the high-stakes test.  We included in our model a set of 53 
pre-treatment student-level covariates from our dataset and teacher and school-level 
covariates drawn from Texas’ Academic Excellence Indicator System. These variables 
included students’ race, free lunch status, limited English proficiency status, students’ 
Stanford scale score at the end of the 2002-2003 school year, grade level, school size, per-
pupil expenditures, teacher characteristics such as experience, salary, and race, school passing 
rates in the prior year, and school-level demographic composition variables including the 
percent of students who are bilingual, gifted, African-American, Hispanic, and special 
education. (A full list of these variables, as well as means for tested and untested students, is 
available in Appendix Table A1.) Achieving optimal covariate balance between matched 
treatment and control groups, rather than statistical significance, was the key criterion for 
keeping a covariate in our model predicting students’ propensity scores.  We employed 
within caliper (.001) nearest neighbor matching with replacement. For example, if a tested 
student’s predicted probability of taking the high-stakes test was .532, and no untested 
student had a predicted probability of .532 ± .001, this case was not matched and thus is not 
included in our estimates of treatment effects. While there is a tradeoff in using such a tight 
matching criterion, as matching fewer cases means that our treatment effect estimates have 
larger standard errors, we preferred this outcome to matching dissimilar students and 
potentially upwardly biasing our treatment effect estimates. We further constrained our 
matches in two ways. We required students to match with their peers in the same grade level, 
and required LEP students to match only with their LEP counterparts.  
After matching tested and untested students with similar propensities to be tested, we tested 
the simulated treatment and control groups to ensure that matches were balanced on all 53 
pre-treatment covariates. Our sample included the 9,566 special education students enrolled 
in grades 3-11 who took the reading component of the Stanford Achievement Test in 2002-
2003 and 2003-2004, and the 9,563 special education students who took the math 
component of this test in the same years.  
Our first objective was to establish the “average treatment effect on the treated.” Here, this 
refers to the effect of taking the high-stakes test on the average academic gain of the children 
in the “treatment” group compared to the outcomes these children would have had they 
been in the “control,” or untested, group, i.e.:  
E[Yi(1)-Yi(0) | Zi=1] = E[Yi(1) | Zi=1]—E[Yi(0) | Zi=1] 
where Zi  is the treatment experienced by student i and Yi  is an outcome affected by the 
treatment.2 Because we are interested not only in the average treatment effect, but in how 
this effect varies across the propensity score distribution, we then divided students into four 
quartiles based on their propensity to be tested and estimated an average treatment effect 
within each quartile.  
In these analyses, academic growth is operationalized as the change in students’ Stanford 
National Percentile score between the 2003 and 2004 administrations of the test (these 
national norms remained constant across the two years and were not affected by HISD 
students’ performance).3 We chose this metric as it is familiar to most researchers and 
educators, and is easily interpretable.  Students take the Stanford exam in the spring, 
approximately one month before they take the TAKS exam. However, Stanford results are 
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not available to teachers or parents until well after the TAKS tests are administered, and thus 
are not being used in real time to select students to take the TAKS.  
The observable characteristics of students, teachers, and schools to which we have access go a 
long way towards controlling for differences in the school environments that students 
experience, but we recognize that there are also unobserved elements of schools that affect 
both students’ probabilities of treatment as well as students’ academic growth. We thus used 
two different matching approaches. First, we constrained our matches to students in the 
same school with similar propensities to be tested and estimated these effects separately for 
grades 3-8 and grades 9-11.   Next, we allowed tested students to match with untested 
students in any HISD school and compared these estimates with our within-school matching 
estimates. Upon finding these results to be qualitatively similar, we took advantage of the 
larger sample allowed by the between-school matching approach to examine both treatment 
heterogeneity more closely across levels of schooling as well as across the propensity score 
distribution.  
The primary threat to our treatment effect estimates is the potential presence of an omitted 
variable that both affects students’ odds of being tested and students’ academic growth 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin 1983b). For example, if tested students had significantly larger levels 
of school engagement than did exempted students, these students might be more likely to be 
tested and to gain more academically. In other words, we want to know how large the effect 
of an omitted variable would have to be to diminish our treatment effect estimates. To 
address this concern, we generated variables to mimic the effects of two of our strongest 
predictors of test taking and academic gain in our model: classification in special education 
for at least two years (2003 and 2004) and being an African-American student. We then re-
estimate our treatment effects separately under each of these cases to demonstrate how robust 
our results are to the presence of unobserved variables.  
 
 
| 4 | RESULTS 
Descriptive Results  
Table 1 presents the percent of students taking the reading and math TAKS by demographic 
group and by grade. Overall, 87.6 percent of students take the TAKS reading test, and 88 
percent take the math test. Test taking, however, varies significantly by demographic group 
and by grade. Among racial and ethnic groups, white students are the most likely to take the 
TAKS (reading=92.8%, math=92.9%), while African-American students are the least likely 
(reading=85.4%, math=86.3%). Limited English Proficient and special education students 
are much less likely to take the TAKS than their general education counterparts. Only 
31.3% and 36.9% of special education students take the reading and math tests, respectively. 
In addition, TAKS test taking declines as grade level increases. While 91.4% of third graders 














White 92.79  92.88  
Asian 91.96  92.19  
Hispanic 87.63  87.83  
Poor 86.22  86.73  
African-American 85.37  86.25  
LEP 79.47  79.76  
Special Education31.25  36.85  
Grade 3 91.36  91.94  
Grade 4 88.71  90.00  
Grade 5 87.93  89.13  
Grade 6 87.50  88.28  
Grade 7 86.46  87.17  
Grade 8 86.90  87.26  
Grade 9 84.21  83.02  
Grade 10 88.12  87.55  
Grade 11 86.11  86.02  
Total 87.58  87.97  
n 129,989 
 
As expected, TAKS test taking is strongly associated with students’ academic performance. 
Figure 1 presents the percentage of students taking the TAKS test by their national percentile 
on the Stanford 10 test. The percentage of students taking the TAKS increases 
logarithmically as percentile on the Stanford exam increases.  
 
Figure 1. The Relationship Between TAKS Test Taking and Stanford National Percentile  
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Do schools strategically exempt low-scoring students, and how do these exemptions vary by school?   
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in this analysis, while Tables 3a 
and 3b present a series of hierarchical logistic regression models predicting English and 
Spanish TAKS test taking, respectively. The coefficients of interest are those on the dummy 
variables for our five categories of low Stanford and Aprenda scores: the 1-9, 10-19, 20-29, 
30-39, and 40-49 percentiles.  
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Variables Used in Hierarchical Logistic Regression 
Models  
 
 English TAKS Spanish TAKS




Take Reading TAKS 117593 0.878 9412 0.914 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda  
National Percentile Rank (NPR) 1-9
117593 0.104 9412 0.044 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 10-19 117593 0.097 9412 0.050 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 20-29 117593 0.121 9412 0.045 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 30-39 117593 0.113 9412 0.069 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 40-49 117593 0.106 9412 0.085 0 1 
Special education 117593 0.117 9412 0.058 0 1 
Poor 117593 0.718 9412 0.967 0 1 
Limited English Proficient 117593 0.180 9412 0.984 0 1 
Hispanic 117593 0.530 — — 0 1 
African-American 117593 0.331 — — 0 1 
White 117593 0.105 — — 0 1 
Grade 3 117593 0.096 9412 0.584 0 1 
Grade 4 117593 0.115 9412 0.364 0 1 
Grade 5 117593 0.132 9412 0.052 0 1 
Grade 6 117593 0.125 — — 0 1 
Grade 7 117593 0.123 — — 0 1 
Grade 8 117593 0.110 — — 0 1 
Grade 9 117593 0.135 — — 0 1 
Grade 10 117593 0.094 — — 0 1 
Grade 11 117593 0.071 — — 0 1 
Math Analyses 
Take Math TAKS 117635 0.882 9397 0.909 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda  
National Percentile Rank (NPR) 1-9
117635 0.049 9397 0.050 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 10-19 117635 0.087 9397 0.057 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 20-29 117635 0.114 9397 0.087 0 1 
Stanford/Aprenda NPR 30-39 117635 0.108 9397 0.090 0 1 
 
Note: Because fixed student characteristics (i.e. grade level and race) do not vary in a meaningful way 
across reading and math models, this table reports student characteristic descriptive statistics for students 
included in our reading models; the Stanford/Aprenda national percentile rank is reported separately for 
both reading and math models. 
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Table 3a. Logit Coefficients from Hierarchical Logistic Regression of Taking the English 
TAKS on Student Characteristics 
 
 Math Reading 









































































































^ p≤.10; * p≤.05; ** p≤.01; *** p≤.001 
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Table 3b. Logit Coefficients from Hierarchical Logistic Regression of Taking the Spanish 
TAKS on Student Characteristics 
 
 Math Reading 




















































 ^ p≤.10; * p≤.05; ** p≤.01; *** p≤.001 
 
Students with higher Stanford national percentile scores are more likely to take the TAKS, 
and these effects are non-linear. Relative to students at or above the 50th percentile, students’ 
odds of taking the TAKS are 90% lower for math (Odds Ratio=.095) and 95% lower for 
reading (Odds Ratio=.051) if they score in the 1-9th percentile. While students in the 40-
49th percentile are still much less likely to take the TAKS than students above the 50th 
percentile, their odds of taking the test are much higher (Odds Ratio for Math and 
Reading=.53). Even net of their lower test scores, students classified as LEP or special 
education have much lower odds of taking the TAKS than do general education students. 
This suggests that the opportunity structure for exemption matters. The models predicting 
Spanish TAKS test taking presented in Table 3b show a similar pattern; low-scoring students 
are much less likely to take the high-stakes test. Taken together, these results provide strong 
evidence that schools use exemption strategically.   
School effects on taking the high-stakes test are substantial in size. One way of thinking 
about the size of school effects is to consider the impact of moving a student from a school in 
the 25th percentile of the school effects distribution (the distribution of school intercepts in 
our hierarchical model) to the 75th percentile. Net of the individual characteristics of students 
included in our model, we find that moving a student from a 25th to a 75th percentile 
school increases her probability of taking the English TAKS test by .165 (25th 
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percentile=.420, 75th percentile=.585). School effects are of similar size for the math test; the 
difference in a student’s probability of taking the TAKS for a school in the 25th percentile of 
the distribution versus the 75th is .171 (25th percentile=.422, 75th percentile=.593).  
 
How does student exemption impact schools’ passing rates and the estimated size of achievement 
gaps?  
Our data allow us to predict the scores of students who were not tested, and then recalculate 
schools’ passing rates to demonstrate the impact of exemption. Table 4 shows the overall 
results of our imputation. We provide passing rates for two different ways of measuring 
schools’ performance. First, we display the official passing rates released by the Texas 
Education Agency. Using this measure, an average of 67 percent and 80 percent of students 
in HISD passed the math and reading tests, respectively. Second, we calculate the percent 
passing if all students were tested and counted. In this case, the passing rate falls to 57.5 and 
69.0 percent for math and reading. In short, exemption produces an increase of 9.5 
percentage points in the passing rate for math and an 11 percent increase for reading. 
 












Official Math Pass Rate 67.0 59.0 65.0 89.0 63.0 61.0 43.0 
Math Pass Rate if All Students 
Were Tested and Counted 57.5 50.4 55.8 81.9 53.7 47.2 14.3 
Official Reading Pass Rate 80.0 79.0 77.0 94.0 77.0 63.0 59.0 
Reading Pass Rate if All Students 
Were Tested and Counted 69.0 66.5 66.6 86.5 65.3 49.8 17.0 
 
The impact of exemption, however, is not uniform across schools. The graphs in Figure 2 
plot the official passing rate against the passing rate if all tested students are counted. A 
school with no difference in the two passing rates would fall on the 45-degree line; data 
points above this line indicate that schools had a higher percentage of students passing 
because of this provision.  Almost all schools fall above the 45-degree line, and some fall 
substantially above this line.  
Table 4 further disaggregates the imputation results by subgroup, and shows that the effects 
of exemption on passing rates are not uniformly distributed across subgroups. The difference 
between the official pass rate for reading and the pass rate if all students were tested and 
counted is greatest for special education and LEP students. For math, the official special 
education pass rate is 28.7% higher than our imputed rate, while it is 13.8% higher for LEP, 
9.3% higher for poor students, 8.6% higher for African-American students, and 9.2% higher 
for Hispanic students. For reading, the official special education pass rate is 42% higher than 
our imputed rate, while it is 13.2% higher for LEP, 12.5% higher for African-Americans, 
11.7% higher for poor students, and 10.4% higher for Hispanic students.  
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Figure 2. The Impact of Test Exemption on Schools’ Reading Pass Rates  
 




Note: In these graphs, official reading and math pass rates are plotted against the imputed pass rate, which simulates 
a scenario in which all students are tested and counted. Points above the 45 degree line indicate that schools’ scores 
were higher as a function of these exemptions. 
 
Because of test exemption, the size of the achievement gap is underestimated.  With exemption, the 
size of the African-American/white achievement gap is 30% for math, while the size of the 
Hispanic/white gap is 24%. If all students were tested and counted, these respective achievement 
gaps would grow to 31.5% and 26.1%. Exemption thus deflates these achievement gaps by 1.5 and 
2.1 percent, respectively. These effects are larger for reading than for math. The African-
American/white reading achievement gap is 5 percent larger without exemption, while the 
Hispanic/white gap is 2.9 percent larger. These are non-trivial rates of inflation.  
Another way of thinking about the impact of these differences in passing rates is to consider what 
accountability rating Texas would assign each school if all students had been tested and counted. We 
calculate new ratings only for reading and math, and do so separately. In other words, while multiple 
subjects are used together to calculate ratings, we consider the rating parameter into which a school 
falls into based on its reading or math scores alone to analytically distinguish effects on math and 
reading scores. Schools in Texas can earn one of four ratings: Exemplary, Recognized, Acceptable, or 
Academically Unacceptable.  In 2003-2004, to earn an exemplary rating, 90% of students must pass 
all subjects; to earn a recognized rating, 70% of students must pass all subjects, and to earn an 
acceptable rating, 70% of students must passing the reading test and 35% of students must pass the 
math test. Table 5 illustrates how schools’ ratings would change if all students were tested and 
counted. The downward mobility that would result is significant:  
o For reading, 106 schools, or 37.7% of all Houston schools, would fall into a lower rating 
category if all students were tested on the TAKS and counted. 
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o For math, 78 schools, or 27.7% of Houston schools, would fall into a lower rating 
category. 
o For reading, 36.8% of Exemplary schools would decline to Recognized status. For math, 
39.2% of Exemplary schools would decline to Recognized status. 
o 15.2% of Recognized schools would decline to acceptable status for reading, while 
29.4% of Recognized schools would do so for math. One Recognized school would 
decline to Academically Unacceptable status. 
o 13.3% of Acceptable schools would decline to Academically Unacceptable status for 
reading, while 9.9% of Acceptable schools would do so for math. 
 
In short, the performance of Houston schools would be dramatically lower if all students took the 
TAKS and were counted towards each school’s scores. 
 
Table 5. Official Accountability Ratings and Ratings if All Students Were Tested and Counted 
 
  Official Reading 
Accountability Rating 
Rating If All Students 
Tested and Counted  
Official Math 
Accountability Rating 
Rating If All Students 
Tested and Counted 
Exemplary 24.20% (68) 8.90% (25) 18.09% (51) 7.09% (20) 
Recognized 58.36% (164) 53.38% (150) 44.68% (126) 42.20% (119) 
Acceptable 16.01% (45) 34.16% (96) 32.27% (91) 42.20% (119) 
Academically 
Unacceptable 
1.42% (4) 3.20% (9) 4.96% (14) 8.51% (24) 
 
What is the causal effect of testing on special education students’ academic growth?  
We hypothesized that students who took the high-stakes test in 2003-2004—that is, the students for 
whom schools and teachers were held accountable—would exhibit a greater one year gain in their 
national percentile rank on the Stanford Achievement Test than the same students would if they 
were not tested. If this is true, one possible explanation is the strategic allocation of school and 
teacher instructional resources. We suggest that schools and teachers spend more time and attention 
on those students who “count” and divert attention away from those students who do not “count,” 
those students who are exempted.  A second possibility, however, is that students’ level of effort 
increases if they find out that they are taking the TAKS rather than the SDAA tests. Given the 
nature of our data, it is unclear if students in Houston know which test they are taking, and this 
likely varies across schools and teachers. It is also unknown how much students’ effort would 
increase if they were taking the TAKS rather than the SDAA; in both cases, students have to sit for a 
multi-hour standardized exam and ultimately receive a score on the exam.  
Figure 3 shows the proportion of tested and untested students across the propensity score 
distribution for grades 3-5. Across the entire propensity score distribution, some students were 











Distribution of Tested and Exempted Students 



















Why might it be the case that across the entire distribution, some students are tested and others are 
not? First, teachers attending an Individual Education Plan meeting are not econometricians with 
perfect information about a student’s prior performance on standardized tests, which introduces 
some level of noise into test-taking decisions. Second, schools and teachers likely vary in their 
exemption practices; a tested student in one school might be exempted if he attended another 
school. Finally, parents sit on IEP committees and have some input in this decision. We imagine 
that some parents may want their children to be tested on high-stakes tests, while others may not. In 
sum, there is some element of randomness built into these processes that produces the distribution of 
test-taking and exemption displayed in Figure 3.  
Before moving to our treatment effect estimates, we draw attention to the observable differences in 
the treated and untreated populations that our matching seeks to correct. In Table A1 (see Appendix 
A), we display the means of treated and untreated students in grades 3-8 for all of our covariates 
before matching. Tested students are much higher scoring, less likely to be of limited English 
proficiency, less likely to be African-American or Hispanic, less likely to be poor, and more likely to 
attend schools with lower proportions of poor and African-American students.  However, as is 
demonstrated by the t tests for differences in means between matched students displayed in the far 
right hand column, our matching was able to eliminate any observable differences between tested 
and exempted students.   
Descriptive statistics for treated and untreated groups’ gain scores are available in Table 6. Table 7 
presents the average treatment effects of taking the TAKS test.  First, we discuss our most 
conservative estimates, where matches are constrained such that students can only match with 
another student in their school. Because of the small number of cases that we are able to match this 











































Table 7), we pool students in grades 3-8 in one analysis and then examine grades 9-11 separately. In 
all of these analyses, however, students can only match with a student in the same grade level. We 
found that students in grades 3-8 who were tested gained more academically in one year than 
matched students who were not tested. The average treatment effect was a gain of 5.7 national 
percentile points for reading and 4.3 national percentile points for math. The treatment effect of 
taking the reading test for students in grades 9-11 is 2.9, but this result is only statistically significant 
at the .10 level (t=1.913). We find no treatment effect of taking the high school TAKS math test. 
 
Table 6.  Means and Standard Deviations for 2003-2004 Gain in Stanford National Percentile by 
Treatment 
 
 Untreated Treated 
 Mean  SD Mean  SD 
Reading 
3-5 .023 11.859 -.428 14.446 
3-8 .933 10.921 1.484 14.237 
6-8 1.632 10.089 2.865 13.929 
9-11 1.398 10.775 3.029 13.376 
Math 
3-5 .690 12.900 .562 16.19 
3-8 1.478 12.186 .216 15.387 
6-8 2.024 11.637 -.084 14.650 
9-11 5.148 16.191 2.312 17.179 
 
We now turn to the estimates of treatment effects where we allow matching across schools and 
compare them with our within-school estimates. The results for Reading and Math in grades 3-8 are 
slightly larger than the within-school estimates (6.0 and 5.7). The results for high school reading are 
also larger (5.3), and there continues to be no treatment effect associated with taking the high school 
math TAKS.  These results are similar enough to the within-school estimates to justify using this 
method to examine how these effects vary across grade level and across the propensity score 
distribution, which we would not be able to do if we restricted our matches to students in the same 
school.  
In the bottom panel of Table 7, we re-estimate average treatment effects, but now examine three sets 
of grade levels separately: 3-5, 6-8, and 9-11. Treatment effects are larger for grades 3-5 than they are 
for grades 6-8 and 9-11, with reading treatment effects of 7.4, 6.5, and 5.1, respectively. The parallel 
treatment effects for math are 7.0 for grades 3-5 and 5.2 for grades 6-8.  
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Table 7.  Average Treatment Effects of Taking the High-Stakes Test on Special Education 
Students’ Gain in Stanford National Percentile 
 
PANEL A 




Match Only Within-school 
Reading 3-8 4.671 -1.053 5.724 1.684 3.399*** 4950 2048 170 6998 
Reading 9-11 4.218 1.312 2.906 1.519 1.913^ 1519 1049 170 2568 
Math 3-8 3.457 -0.821 4.277 1.662 2.573*** 4356 2642 173 6998 
Math 9-11 2.615 3.926 -1.311 2.585 -0.507 1456 1109 135 2565 
Match Overall 
Reading 3-8 4.387 -1.626 6.012 0.825 7.287*** 4950 2048 827 6998 
Reading 9-11 3.571 -1.746 5.318 0.854 6.227*** 1519 1049 800 2568 
Math 3-8 2.801 -2.864 5.665 0.759 7.464*** 4356 2642 1100 6998 










Grades 3-5 3.542 -3.884 7.426 1.252 5.930*** 2151 859 336 3010 
Grades 6-8 5.111 -1.370 6.481 1.077 6.018*** 2799 1189 530 3988 
Grades 9-11 3.571 -1.746 5.318 0.854 6.227*** 1519 1049 800 2568 
Math 
Grades 3-5 4.510 -2.519 7.030 1.345 5.227*** 1783 1227 437 3010 
Grades 6-8 2.294 -2.919 5.214 0.940 5.547*** 2573 1415 618 3988 













Quartile 1 8.375 3.167 5.208 2.634 1.977* 729 24 24 753
Quartile 2 7.351 -1.088 8.439 2.591 3.257** 673 79 57 752
Quartile 3 4.753 -2.571 7.324 2.538 2.886** 518 235 105 753
Quartile 4 -0.409 -10.272 9.864 5.540 1.781^ 231 521 22 752
Math 
Quartile 1 10.020 4.392 5.627 2.594 2.169* 691 62 51 753
Quartile 2 8.400 3.453 4.947 2.437 2.030* 571 181 95 752
Quartile 3 3.705 -2.754 6.459 2.675 2.415* 379 374 122 753
Grades  
3-5 
Quartile 4 -1.250 -12.125 10.875 4.364 2.492* 142 610 56 752
Reading 
Quartile 1 6.737 1.816 4.921 2.058 2.391* 954 42 38 997
Quartile 2 6.574 0.819 5.755 1.85 3.111** 885 112 94 997
Quartile 3 4.083 -0.472 4.556 1.841 2.475* 681 316 144 997
Quartile 4 3.497 -4.222 7.719 2.566 3.008** 279 718 167 997
Math 
Quartile 1 8.656 6.82 1.836 1.907 0.963 927 70 61 997
Quartile 2 5.685 2.099 3.586 1.776 2.019* 842 155 111 997
Quartile 3 0.261 -3.087 3.348 4.53 0.739 584 413 23 997
Grades  
6-8 
Quartile 4 -2.237 -7.452 5.215 3.262 1.599 220 777 93 997
Reading 
Quartile 1 5.859 4.366 1.493 1.885 0.792 569 73 71 642
Quartile 2 6.509 2.376 4.133 1.344 3.075** 465 177 173 642
Quartile 3 5.434 0.139 5.294 1.378 3.842*** 333 309 265 642
Quartile 4 -0.74 -6.693 5.953 2.249 2.647** 152 490 192 642
Math 
Quartile 1 10.237 10.368 -0.132 4.138 -0.032 565 77 38 642
Quartile 2 4.88 3.205 1.675 3.128 0.535 457 184 83 641
Quartile 3 2 1.671 0.329 3.774 0.087 305 336 73 641
Grades  
9-11 
Quartile 4 2.655 -3.259 5.914 4.293 1.378 129 512 58 641
 
We were interested not only in the average treatment effect, but also in how this effect varied across 
the propensity score distribution. To examine this heterogeneity, we divided students into four strata 
based on their propensity to take the test and estimated average treatment effects within each of 
these strata. Results from this analysis can be found in Table 8. We found larger treatment effects for 
students with the highest propensity to be tested.  For students in grades 3-5, those who are least 
likely to take the math TAKS have a treatment effect of 5.6, while those who are most likely to take 
the TAKS have a treatment effect of 10.9. This pattern holds for the grades 3-5, 6-8, and 9-11 
reading tests, but not for math tests in grades 6-8 and 9-11.  
Table 8. Heterogeneity of Treatment Effects Across the Propensity Score Distribution  
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Again, there are two potential explanations for this finding. Students’ with higher propensities to be 
tested may be potential “conversions” from failing to passing students, and thus could improve the 
school’s passing rate.  That the treatment effects are largest for students in the strata that offer 
schools the largest investment/return ratio suggests that the mechanism explaining the treatment 
effect may be the diversion of instructional resources. A second possibility often discussed in the 
propensity score matching literature is that students may differ in the benefits that they can derive 
from a given intervention.  It is possible that students in the top quartile of the propensity score 
distribution differentially benefit from this treatment. However, we cannot rule out either 
explanation here, and identifying mechanisms explaining the treatment effect of testing is an 
important area for future research.  
Finally, in order to test the robustness of these results, we simulated the impact of two potential 
omitted variables in order to examine their impact on our treatment effect estimates. The goal of this 
exercise is to understand how large the effect of an omitted variable would have to be to eliminate 
the treatment effects that we observe. Here, we focus on our most conservative estimates for grades 
3-8 (our within school estimates) as we did not find statistically significant treatment effects using 
within school matching estimates for grades 9-11. We first identify two variables that have large 
effects on test taking as well as effects on students’ academic growth: placement in special education 
for at least two years and being African-American. In our model predicting taking the TAKS reading 
for grades 3-8, the odds ratios on these variables are .80 and .45 for reading and .81 and .59 for 
math, respectively.  In two separate simulations, we generated an unobserved variable U with effects 
similar to these variables and re-estimate our treatment effects 100 times in the presence of this 
variable. In grades 3-8, an omitted variable would have to have an effect 34 times the size of being 
black and 42 times the size of being in special education for two years in order to wipe out the 
presence of a treatment effect of testing.  For math in grades 3-8, an omitted variable would have to 
be 65 times the size of being in special education for two years in order to make these estimates 
statistically insignificant; an omitted variable mimicking being black actually slightly increases our 
estimates of math treatment effects because these variables decrease students’ odds of being tested, 
but do not also have a large effect on their year-to-year academic gain. Given that the probability of 
such a variable existing is incredibly small, we conclude that our results are robust to the presence of 
an omitted variable.  
 
| 5 | DISCUSSION 
To date, much of the participation debate has been grounded in rhetorical rather than empirical 
claims. As far as we are aware, this is the first study to estimate the impact of exemption on schools’ 
passing rates and the size of achievement gaps. It is also the first to address the question of whether, 
in the context of a high-stakes accountability system, tested students exhibit more academic growth 
when they are tested than they would if they were not.  
To recapitulate our key findings: first, we found that HISD schools took advantage of the exemption 
opportunities provided by the state to exempt low-scoring students, and, in doing so, increased their 
passing rates by 9.5 percent for math and 11 percent for reading. Thirty-eight percent of schools 
would drop to a lower accountability rating for reading in the absence of these exemptions, while 
28% would do so for math.  
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Second, we established that exemption leads to the underestimation of achievement gaps.4 Because 
Hispanic and African-American students are more likely to be classified in exemptable categories 
(LEP and special education) than are their white counterparts, these students are more likely to be 
exempted. Even within special education students, approximately half of white special education 
students take the TAKS, while only one-third of African-American and Hispanic students do.  (See 
Appendix Tables A2 and A3.) As a result, White/Hispanic and White/African-American 
achievement gaps are larger than they appear to be when students are exempted.  
Finally, we determined that special education students gain more academically when they are tested 
than the same students would have if they were not. These treatment effects are larger for students in 
grades 3-5 than they are for students in grades 6-8. Using our most conservative estimates (matching 
only within-school), the effect of being tested in reading is approximately .40 standard deviations in 
reading and .28 standard deviations in math for grades 3-8.5 By any standard, these effects are large. 
However, using these within-school matching estimates, we found no treatment effect of testing for 
reading and math in grades 9-11.   
Because of the two features discussed above—1) special education students are more likely to be 
minority and poor students than general education students, and 2) among special education 
students, students of color are less likely to take the TAKS—the exemption of special education 
students from state tests and the concomitant academic growth penalty contributes to the growth of 
black-white, Hispanic-white, and high-low socioeconomic status achievement gaps.  
These results have substantial implications for current education policy. One key question at issue in 
high-stakes testing policies is whether special education students should take high-stakes tests. In this 
study, we have demonstrated that in the context of a high-stakes system, tested special education 
students in grades 3-8 exhibit more academic growth when they are tested than they would have if 
they were not.  By the time students reach high school, however, there appear to be diminishing 
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Table A1. Comparison of Treated and Control Groups Before and After Matching for Within-
school Matches, Grades 3-8 
 
Variable        Mean               %reduct      t-test 
Sample  Treated Control    %bias   bias      t     p>t 
Unmatched  .80277  -.32921    124.5           50.24  0.000 Stanford reading (z) 
Matched  .00027     .012     -1.3    99.0   -0.16  0.876 
Unmatched  .62307  -.25475     93.4           36.42  0.000 Stanford math (z) 
Matched  .11328   .05895      5.8    93.8    0.54  0.590 
Unmatched  .11328   .24828    -35.6          -12.79  0.000 Limited English 
Proficient Matched      .1       .1      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .11719   .15434    -10.9           -4.04  0.000 Mobile student 
Matched  .11765   .14706     -8.6    20.8   -0.80  0.425 
Unmatched  .72363   .85879    -33.7          -13.54  0.000 Poor student 
Matched      .8   .81176     -2.9    91.3   -0.27  0.785 
Unmatched  .36328   .47333    -22.4           -8.48  0.000 African-American 
Matched  .58824   .59412     -1.2    94.7   -0.11  0.912 
Unmatched  .44092   .46485     -4.8           -1.83  0.068 Hispanic 
Matched  .33529   .32941      1.2    75.4    0.11  0.909 
Unmatched  .01221   .00808      4.1            1.64  0.102 Asian 
Matched  .00588   .00588      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .07373   .10061     -9.5           -3.53  0.000 New to district in 
previous school year  Matched  .07059   .06471      2.1    78.1    0.22  0.830 
Unmatched  .79688   .89939    -28.9          -11.69  0.000 In special education 
for at least 2 years Matched  .85294   .84118      3.3    88.5    0.30  0.764 
Unmatched  95.929    95.74     12.5            4.71  0.000 School attendance 
Matched  95.487   95.487      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  7.4506   8.7888    -36.8          -14.04  0.000 Size of mobility 
subset Matched  9.0306   9.0306      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  5927.3   6054.5     -7.8           -3.23  0.001 Per-pupil 
expenditures Matched  5941.9   5941.9      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  63.074   71.504    -40.9          -15.92  0.000 Percent minority staff 
Matched  73.848   73.848      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  8.9109   9.0471     -2.9           -1.09  0.275 Percent new teachers 
Matched  8.4582   8.4582      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  339.55    341.2     -5.0           -1.92  0.055 Salary new 
teachers/100 Matched  339.68   339.68      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  33.689   34.085     -3.9           -1.47  0.141 Percent of teachers 
with 1-5 years 
experience 
Matched  35.538   35.538      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  367.37   366.86      5.4            2.09  0.037 Salary 1-5 years 
experience/100 Matched  367.03   367.03      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  15.595   15.325      4.5            1.70  0.090 Percent of teachers 
with 6-10 years 
experience 
Matched  15.811   15.811      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  394.74   394.11      9.3            3.65  0.000 Salary 6-10 years 
experience/100 Matched  393.39   393.39      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  19.881   19.926     -0.6           -0.23  0.819 Percent of teachers 
with11-20 years Matched  18.586   18.586      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
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experience 
Unmatched  463.51    462.6      7.2            2.74  0.006 Salary 11-20 years 
experience/100 Matched  462.65   462.65      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  21.918   21.609      3.5            1.35  0.176 Percent of teachers 
with >20 years 
experience 
Matched  21.595   21.595      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched   560.1   561.28     -7.2           -2.73  0.006 Salary of teachers 
with >20 years 
experience 
Matched  562.02   562.02      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  41.637   49.772    -30.0          -11.28  0.000 Percent African-
American teachers Matched  58.145   58.145      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  11.243   11.157      3.4            1.31  0.189 Average experience 
of teachers Matched  11.044   11.044      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  75.691   74.867      7.2            2.72  0.006 Percent female 
teachers Matched  76.052   76.052      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  15.457   16.179     -4.8           -1.80  0.072 Percent Hispanic 
teachers Matched  10.986   10.986      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched   9.139    9.217     -3.2           -1.22  0.222 Average years of 
HISD teaching 
experience 
Matched  9.0118   9.0118      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  19.669   21.541    -23.2           -9.32  0.000 Percent mobile 
students Matched  21.776   21.776      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  6.7591   6.6819     18.3            6.91  0.000 Ln(student 
enrollment) Matched  6.6849   6.6849      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  20.864   22.713    -10.4           -3.92  0.000 Percent bilingual 
students Matched  17.119   17.119      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  30.553   36.949    -22.1           -8.23  0.000 Percent African-
American students Matched  45.395   45.395      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  80.083   88.775    -43.4          -17.97  0.000  Percent poor  
students Matched  86.689   86.689      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  11.398   7.3414     37.3           15.36  0.000 Percent gifted 
students Matched  8.2429   8.2429      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  54.863   55.459     -2.0           -0.76  0.446 Percent gifted 
students Matched  45.708   45.708      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  22.266   24.113    -10.0           -3.75  0.000 Percent LEP students 
Matched  18.174   18.174      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  3.0126   1.9234     28.7           11.48  0.000 Percent Asian 
students Matched  1.8671   1.8671      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  11.686    12.78    -17.2           -6.61  0.000 Percent special 
education students Matched  14.373   14.373      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  71.419   68.433     18.1            6.91  0.000  School passing rate 
for math, 02-03 Matched  66.215   66.215      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  82.772   80.362     29.0           11.30  0.000 School passing rate 
for reading, 02-03 Matched  80.445   80.445      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched   68.83   67.127     10.6            4.05  0.000  School passing rate 
for math for poor 
students, 02-03 
Matched  64.587   64.587      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  80.781   79.142     21.6            8.33  0.000 School passing rate 
for reading for poor 
students, 02-03 
Matched  78.926   78.926      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
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Unmatched  70.924   68.203     16.4            6.28  0.000 School passing rate 
for math for girls, 02-
03 
Matched  65.662   65.662      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  84.518   82.223     28.9           11.27  0.000 School passing rate 
for reading for girls, 
02-03 
Matched  82.065   82.065      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  71.875   68.639     19.2            7.34  0.000 School passing rate 
for math for boys, 02-
03 
Matched  66.732   66.732      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  80.952   78.429     27.2           10.50  0.000 School passing rate 
for reading for girls, 
02-03 
Matched  78.706   78.706      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .13867   .09899     12.3            4.82  0.000 Grade 3 
Matched  .10588   .10588      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .13037   .15838     -8.0           -2.99  0.003 Grade 4 
Matched  .11765   .11765      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .15039   .17717     -7.2           -2.72  0.007 Grade 5 
Matched  .16471   .16471      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .17578   .21152     -9.1           -3.40  0.001 Grade 6 
Matched  .22353   .22353      0.0   100.0   -0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .22412   .19273      7.7            2.98  0.003 Grade 7 
Matched  .25294   .25294      0.0   100.0    0.00  1.000 
Unmatched  .18066   .16121      5.2            1.99  0.047 Grade 8 





























Table A2. Percent of Students in Special Education by Race and Grade Level 
 
 Grades 3-5 Grades 6-8 Grades 9-11 
Asian 3.38     3.04    1.91     
African-American 14.82   17.48   16.73   
Hispanic 11.43  9.46     9.43     
White 11.82   10.12  8.05     
n 40,445 42,209 35,898 
 
Table A3. Percent of Special Education Students Taking the TAKS, by Race and Grade 
 
Panel A: Reading 
 
 Grades 3-5 Grades 6-8 Grades 9-11 
Asian 31.91    50.00    53.85   
African-American 22.63    22.71    30.55   
Hispanic 24.68 28.84    41.98   
White 52.17    56.82    57.31   
n 5,027 4,998 4,043 
 
 
Panel B: Math 
 
 Grades 3-5 Grades 6-8 Grades 9-11 
Asian 44.68   57.89   57.69   
African-American 30.19   27.64   37.89   
Hispanic 37.37   34.58   40.14   
White 62.45   57.83  53.22   
n 5,027 4,998 4,043 
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Appendix B: Average Treatment Effects by Truncation 
 




































































Note: In our analyses, we truncate students’ year-to-year academic gain at ±25 Stanford national percentile points. 
These graphs show how our average treatment effects change when we use different truncation points. All results are 
statistically significant with the exception of ninth grade math, which does not achieve significance irrespective of the 




                                                                                                                                                             
1 The Houston Independent School District adopted the Stanford 10 exam in 2003-2004 school year and administered 
the Stanford 9 exam in the 2002-2003 school year. We used percentile equation tables provided to us by Harcourt 
Assessment to equate students’ national percentile rank across years. The Aprenda test form and national norms 
remained constant over this time period.    
2 Because matched students are no longer independent of each other and matching with replacement allows students to 
be used as matches multiple times, standard errors may be downwardly biased if they are not adjusted. To address this 
issue, we bootstrapped the standard errors of our average treatment effects, using 1000 repetitions for each treatment 
effect to generate standard error estimates from the empirical sampling distribution.  
3 We took a second step in order to err on the side of conservative treatment effect estimates after examining the 
distribution of year-to-year change scores for tested and exempted students. As multiple scholars of testing have written, 
test scores can be highly volatile from year-to-year, as each observed score has two components: a “true” unobserved score 
and measurement error. If tested and exempted students had identical levels of volatility, this issue would not influence 
our measurement of testing effects. However, tested students have higher levels of volatility in the positive direction than 
do untested students. Since propensity score matching essentially tests for differences in means between matched cases, 
disproportionate positive outlying observations in one group have the potential to substantially inflate the size of 
treatment effects. To address this issue, we truncated change at ± 25 percentile points. That is, a student with an 
observed gain of 30 percentile points is coded as having a gain of 25. We have conducted these analyses with no 
truncation and with truncation at 40, 35, 30, 25, and 20 percentile points; please see Appendix B for estimates of 
treatment effects at each of these truncation points.  
4 We note that differences in rates of passing are imperfect measures of the achievement gap, as the achievement gap as 
measured by passing rates could be closing even as the continuous version of the achievement gap (e.g. based on 
students’ scale scores) is increasing. Nonetheless, we employ this metric here as current policy debates are framed in 
terms of passing rates.  
5 These estimates standardize our treatment effect estimates using the standard deviation of the gain score of the treated 
population, (5.724/14.24 for reading and 4.277/15.39 for math). If we instead use the standard deviation of whole 
population, the effect sizes for grades 3-8 are .48 for reading (5.724/11.99) and .32 for math (4.277/13.5).  
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